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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH by and through

its ROAD COMMISSION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

10910

F. EPHRAIM BATES and
MAE P. BATES,

I
Def end ants and Appellants. [
)

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action wherein Plaintiff claims a right of
eminent domain in the construction of a highway and a stock
trail and in the taking, Defendants' access to water on Silver
!'reek was cut off. Defendants claim that Plaintiff has the
obligation to furnish them access to water or pay additional
compensation therefore.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court, and the Court granted
judgment of $35.00 per acre on 8.71 acres of Defendants'
land by reason of the stock trail construction, but found that
the agreement between the agent of Plaintiff and the Defendants as to water, watering rights, or compensation therefore was not binding.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and Appelants seek a reversal of the trial
court's finding and judgment that the agreement made with
Defendants by the agent of Plaintiff was not binding, and
that Plaintiff should either provide water or pay compensation to Defendants for not doing so in accordance with the
evidence presented. Further, that the trial court should make
additional findings and judgment to conform to the evidence
and facts proved.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the fall of 1959, Mr. Alden S. Adams, an agent of the
State Road Commission of Utah, contacted defendants in
Wanship, Utah, concerning the State Highway Project proposed in that area which would affect defendants' land and
access to water on Silver Creek.
Over the years defendants had watered their cattle and
sheep on the Silver Creek stream in the area where Silver

Creek crosses the corner of section 26, (see exhibit D-10)
and a!Jout 3,000 acres of defendants' land to the north and
'.\'est of that watering area were used by these cattle and
sheep from that stock watering source (TR 12).
Defendants' property extends north and west up a fairly steep slope from Silver Creek to a ridge involving about
:3,000 acres. Then north, beyond the ridge, on the other side
of the mountain, defendants' land includes another approximate 4,000 acres, and this side of the mountain is served by
another stream for stock water purposes.
When defendants discovered that plaintiff's highway
project would cut off their access to Silver Creek and would
affect their use of some 3,000 acres of land, they were vitally
concerned and "water" became the major issue in their discussion with Plaintiff and its agents.
On several of these discussions with Mr. Alden Adams
and a Mr. Stahle, defendants received assurances that the
state would provide them with water (TR 15, 16) and it was
further discussed the possibility or feasibility of the state's
acquisition or exchange of lands with others so that defendants could get access to water (TR 17).
On January 7, 1960, defendants received a letter from
Mr. Alden S. Adams, the agent for plaintiff referring to the
Settlement of the water problems ancl exchange of land (exhibit D-8 and TR 17). Then on February 2, 1960, defendants
received right of way contracts, deeds, and settlement inroices in relation to the taking by plaintiff of defendants'
land, and attached to, and as a part of these contracts, was
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a letter addressed to defendant, Fay E. Bates, and signed by
Alden S. Adams, as agent, wherein defendants were request.
ed to sign the documents, and further that they would b'·
furnished water. It reads as follows:
'
"Relative to the water situation, we do not have
title as yet. The state is endeavoring to make a deal
with your neighbors for some landlocked land which
includes water, which we plan to develop for the land
owners, including yourself. At that time a supple.
mental contract will have to be executed." (Exhibit
D-7 and TR 18).
Defendants thereupon signed the documents and re.
ceived $8,664.00 for the land taken and damages, but nowhere did the documents ref er to the cutting off of defendants' water as part of the damages, and at no time did the
agents for plaintiff discuss with defendants that the damages they were being paid for included their being cut off
from their water. (TR-19)
Thereafter, defendants continually met with agents of
the plaintiff, both at their offices and out on the property
concerning How the water would be furnished defendants,
each year since 1960 and sometimes several times during a
year (TR-21) until the time of trial in February 1967
(TR-30).
In the fall of 1966, Mr. Kenneth Hisatake, attorney for
Plaintiff, had conversations and discussions with Gaylen S.
Young, Jr., counsel for Defendants, concerning a settlement
of the issues between the clients, and the real issue of 11,rfrr
was discussed, and how the state was going to furnish it to

r
5

Defendants, as had been agreed and promised. The state engineers indicated they could build a water trough and pump
the \rater up through a pipe from Silver Creek, inasmuch as
their efforts to obtain water from Mr. Bertagnole's spring
and other sources had not worked out ( TR-38). Defendants,
thereupon met with Mr. Hisatake, one of the state engineers,
and Mr. Young out on the property to discuss further the
fea:;1bility of a pump situation. Defendants were concerned
11 hether a gasoline driven pump placed on the hillside would
be practical and feasible, thus they followed the suggestion
made of obtaining an engineer to make a study and obtain a
report on how best to secure the water. Mr. Wayne D.
Criddle, an engineer and expert in the field of water, and
formerly having spent eight years as the state engineer,
was hired by Defendants for this purpose.
i\lr. Criddle came up with three alternate methods of
supplying water to Defendants for their cattle and sheep, as
well as the cost of each, and this he testified to at the trial
(TR-44-49).

Thus, the fact of the continuous discussions, promises,
and actions on the part of Plaintiff and their agents in the
furnishing of water to Defendants was shown not only by
the testimony of l\ir. Fay Bates and the letters of Alden S.
Adams, agent but it was corroborated by the testimony of
Mac Bates, ( TR-32) John Bates, (TR-31, 32) and Gaylen
Young, ( TR-38, 39). Furthermore, Plaintiffs' witnesses, Mr.
HisatakP and Mr. Wheadon, substantially corroborated the
fad of the continuous recognition by the Plaintiff and its
agentK to furnish water to Defendants and their efforts to
du .;o ( TR-6, 7, 8, 35).
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About two days prior to trial, counsel for Plaintill
notified counsel for Defendants that the state would not
furnish water to Defendants, nor would they pay compen~a
tion for not doing so ( TR-30). Thus, counsel for Defendanb
asked for a special pre-trial conference to determine the
issues at the trial. The court, at that hearing, suggested 1;,
Defendants that if they would repay the State Roa<l Corn.
mission $8,664.00 together with interest thereon since Feb.
ruary 2, 1960, at 6% per annum, it would consider starting
all over on the issue of damages in the original taking anrl
the water issue could be determined with it.
Defendants could not come up with that amount of cash,
and it was finally determined that, along with the isiue of
damages for the land taken from Defendants by Plaintiff
in the construction of the stock trail, the issue of whether
the state should be required to furnish water to Defendants,
or pay compensation for not doing so, would be heard.
Then after hearing the evidence presented on February
20, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment that the
agreement made by Alden S. Adams was not binding on
Plaintiff and that Defendants were not entitled to further
compensation (R-23).

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PURPORTED AGREEMENT MADE BY ALDEN S.

1
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ADAMS WAS NOT BINDING AND THAT THE DEPENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY FURTHER
COMPENSATION.

From the very beginning of contacts made with Defendants by Plaintiff and their agents regarding the highway project proposed and the taking of land, the question of
1raler and the furnishing of water was the paramount issue
and of most concern to Defendants.
Mr. Fay Bates, Defendant, testified that the first contact by the State Highway Department was made in 1959
dnd his testimony is as follows: (TR-14-15)

A. "Well, the first contact that I had was from a Mr.
Alden Adams who was acting as right-of-way
purchasing agent for the state of Utah."
Q. "I see."

A. "And we discussed, of course the new project, and
what implications there was and that there was
in fact to be a non-access fence on both sides of
the canyon to control livestock and other things,
and, of course, on the initial encounter with Mr.
Adams we discussed the various ways, or effects
that this would have upon the landowners, and,
of course, paramount and immediate and probably basic to all other things was the use or
access to water by stock which was to be grazed
on this area."
Q. "Was anything said by Mr. Adams on this occa-

sion?"

A. "Yes."

r
i
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Q. "What was said?"

A. "Mr. Adams assured me the state would provirle
water."
Q. "Even though they took your water access in thi~
area from you?"

A. "They would provide me with water regardless o!
what else they did, they would provide me with
water. That was the basic issue."
Defendant Bates further testified that he had about
four or five conversations with Mr. Adams and others prior
to February 2, 1960 and on each of those occasions it was
represented that the state would provide Defendant with
water (TR-16).
On January 7, 1960 Defendant, Bates, received some
documents attached to a letter from Alden S. Adams, rightof-way agent (Exhibit D-8). The letter states as follows:
"Attached, hereto, please find right-of-way en·
try agreement, in triplicate, giving the Road Com·
mission permission to enter up your property needed
for the construction of the above project.
Messers Arnold Shields and Leo Bertagnole have
given the Road Commission a right of entry due to
the fact that the closing of the right-of-way contracts
cannot be made until after the water problems awl
exchange of land has been settled.
We are wondering if you would execute the right
of entry since the information you request regardin.g
your neighbors is not yet decided. If you agree to thI'
kindly execute two copies of the agreement and r~
turn to this office."

1
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Effort was made by the state to make an exchange and
lo acquire certain land as a source of water for Defendants
(TR-17).

Then again on February 2, 1960 the following document was received from Alden S. Adams, directed to Defendant, Fay E. Bates (Exhibit D-7) :
"Attached, hereto, please find right-of-way contracts, deeds, and right-of-way settlement invoices
covering parcels No. 49 :B, 56, 47 :A, 51 :A, 51-E,
and 56 :A of the above project.
Will you kindly sign the papers and also have
your wife sign the same. Your signatures on the invoices and deeds will have to be notarized.
Please note that we have protected you on the
only fence where will be any problem on. All of the
other fences are solid NA fence, no access.

Relative to the water situation, we do not have
title as yet. The state is endeavoring to make a deal
with your neighbors for some landlocked land which
includes water, which we plan to develop for the
landowners, including ,yourself. At that time a supplemental contract will have to be executed."
Defendants therefore signed the deeds and contracts
and received a certain amount of money, but nowhere was
there reference to the fact that the money received was also
for the taking of their water source, but to the contrary,
Defendants continued to expect the state to furnish them
another water source, and the Plaintiff and its agents continued to lead Defendants to believe that they were honestly
i1ying to do that.

"""'I
I

10

Defendant, Fay Bates, further testified of these fact.~"'
follows: (TR 19-21)
Q. "Since February 2, 1960, what efforts, if am

have you made to get this water situatin;1
solved?"

A. "I have met with the State Highway Purcha~ing
Right of Way Department down there on several
occasions. On one specific occasion I recall mi,
wife and I went down there to discuss this with
Mr. Adams : "
Q. "This was after February 2, 1960 ?"

A. "Yes, and we were informed-we did talk to Mr.
Adams briefly but, Mr. Adams informed us that
he had other business that he must take care of,
but mainly that he, in fact, had been taken off
of this project and that there had been another
man attached to this particular project in the
right-of-way purchasing department, and he re·
ferred us to a Mr. Williams who we talked to at
that time."
THE COURT-"Clarence Williams?"
THE WITNESS-"! believe that was the name."
Q. "To discuss this water situation?"

A. "Yes. We did discuss it with Mr. Williams, and
he, of course, did not have a solution to it. He
was apprized of the situation. We told him that
we were desirous of getting a settlement, and. he
again told us that the state was trying to effed
a satisfactory settlement and that they would
continue to do so.
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THE COURT: "To get you water?"
THE WITNESS: "To get us water, and further on
several other occasions when we discussed the
thing we were told that we would be supplied
with water."
Q. "Did they come out to your property on definite

occasions for discussions with you concerning
this?"

A. "There were various men, various men in the department that we discussed this with besides
Mr. Stahle and Mr. Adams."
Q. "Well, did they - - "

A. "We discussed the situation with Mr. Hepworth
also, who was the project engineer."
Q. "Did any of them at any time say they were not

going to provide you with water?"

A. ''No. It wasn't said they weren't, but only - -"
Q. "How?"

A. "How the water was to be supplied, and not a
question of whether it would be or could be."
Q. "Did they go to some effort to try and locate an-

other spring of water for you?"

A. "We discussed the possibility of a natural spring
that was on other land."
Q. "Was that Mr. Bertagnole's land?"

A. "That was Mr. Bertagnole's land, and we discussed the possibilities and feasibilities of devel-
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oping it, and at one other time as to whether thi
would develop, how it could be done that wa'.
satisfactory."
·
Q. "Have you been discussing, under the taking and

their statement, the possibility of providing vou
with water ever since 1960 then?"
·

A. "Yes, we have."
Q. "Some time each year since 1960, without stop!"

A. "Yes, often several times during a year."
Counsel for Defendants, Gaylen S. Young, Jr., testified
also at the trial of the further efforts on the part of the state
to furnish Defendants with water and the fact of their rec.
ognizing an actual obligation to furnish water. Mr. Young's
testimony is as follows: (TR-38)
"It is my testimony that a few days following October 20, 1966, after receiving a letter from Mr.
Kenneth Hisatake, attorney for the Plaintiff, that I
informed him of the question of water being the real
issue in this case and the furnishing of Mr. Bates
water on his land.

"Mr. Hisatake told me that he would contact the
Engineer's office, or those from the State Road Com·
mission who had the information, and let me know
later. It was a few days later that I had a call from
Mr. Kenneth Hisatake in which he informed me that
he had discussed the matter with agents from the
State Road Commission and that Mr. Bates was, in
fact, entitled to water, that they had agreed tofu~
nish him with water, and that they were making el·
forts to provide him with that water but so far th~s:
efforts had not materialized in obtaining a spnnb

from Mr. Bertagnole or from other sources, but that
the state would be able to build a pump and a watering trough and that it would be necessary for us to
go out to the property of Mr. Bates to see exactly
what that would be like in order to provide him with
water."
The testmony of Mae Bates and John Bates was also the
r;arne as Defendant Fay Bates as to these facts, (TR 31-32).
Furt.hermore, Plaintiff did not dispute these things and the
evidence presented, but relied merely on the position that the
Plaintiff was not bound, under the law, to perform regardless of its promises or agreements to furnish water to
Defendants.
For the state to take this position, after leading Defendants on for over six years that they were to receive a
supplemental contract on water rights and that they were
actually making effort to develop another water source, is
~imply manifestly unjust, inequitable, and we believe contrary to the law.
Had Defendants realized that the state did not intend
to honor its commitments to them, they could have refused to
sign the original contracts and deeds and obtained relief
through the courts for the loss of about 3,000 acres of land
by reason of their loss of water, and which Defendants believe is far in excess of the $8,664.00 received by them for
the land. taken originally. However, to compel Defendants to
return the money received, after these many years, with int~rest as was suggested by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference, places them at a great disadvantage.
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Furthermore, as the letter of Alden S. Adams of Feb.
ruary 2, 1960 was attached to and made a part of the docu.
ments sent out, the reference to the plan to dei-elop and fi:r
nish water for Def enrlants and the intent to enter intn 11
supplemental contract, constitutes a "condition subsequent''
and the Plaintiff's failure and refusal to abide by this ~ondi.
tion amounts to a breach and failure to pay, which in atcordance with 78-34-14 of Utah code annotated 1953 entitles
the Defendants to the restoration of possession of their
property and an annulment of the entire proceedings.
The Plaintiff can furnish a source of water to Defenddants, though, if they will just do so, as was outlined in 3
alternate methods by Mr. Criddle, Engineer, at the trial
(TR 44-49), and the state should be bound by their promises
and agreements to do it.

In 43 Am. Jur. 71, Section 254 it states:
"When power or jurisdiction is delegated to any
public officer over a subject matter, and its exercise
is confided to his discretion, the acts done in the exercise of the authority are, in general, binding and
valid as to the subject matter."
Mr. Alden Adams, right-of-way agent, was given power
or jurisdiction to negotiate with Defendants on their land.
and we submit that he had discretion to deal on the basis of
furnishing water. However, not only did Alden Adams a'·
sure Defendants of providing water, but others in the rightof-way department gave these assurances over a six year
period (TR 16, 19-21, 38), and if the state claims that Ad·
ams did not have authority to deal with Defendants on

1
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water, the further promises and actions of the other officers
au<l agents of Plaintiff certainly constitute a ratification and
validation of Alden Adams' actions. See 42 Am. Jur. 319,
Section 27:
"Acts of administrative authorities unauthorized at the time may become valid and binding by
ratification ... "
The question arises then, whether Alden Adams, as a
public officer, was in fact acting within the scope of his
authority in dealing with Defendants on the issue of water,
so that the principles of agency should apply. We submit that
he was acting within the scope of his authority even though
not specifically directed or requested to do so by his superior.
See 43 Am. Jur. 85, Section 273, wherein it states:
"In order that acts may be done within the scope
of official authority, it is not necessary that they be
prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or requested by a superior officer, but it
is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation
to matters committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they have more or less connection with
such matters . .. "
Now at the trial of these issues, Plaintiff made no
showing whatsoever of any lack of authority on the part of
Plaintiff's agents to deal with Defendants on the furnishing
of water except that after both sides had rested their case,
and ;1 days later at the time set for argument, and over the
objections made by counsel for Defendants, testimony was
heard from Mr. Anthony Rudelich touching on the authority
nf Alden S. Adams, only. We submit to this court that it was

lG
error for the trial court to allow in the record the testimony
of Mr. Hudelich, after both sides had rested their case. Upon
stipulation of the parties, counsel for Plaintiff had agreed
to try and get Mr. Alden S. Adams into court at the time of
argument to be examined by counsel for Defendants, for the
state had agreed to have him present previously at the trial
on February 20, 1967, but he had suddenly gone out of town
on state business and was still not available. So rather than
obtaining Mr. Adams, Plaintiff brought in Mr. Rudelich, and
thus the objection to his testimony was voiced.
Should this court, however, consider his testimony, we
call the court's attention to the fact that it goes only to the
authority of a "negotiator" and not to others in the depart.
ment who also acted on this matter of providing water for
Defendants, including Mr. Hisatake and those with whom
he dealt, such as Robert Wheadon, project engineer. Furthermore, Mr. Rudelich admitted that upon proper clearance,
matters outside the right-of-way contract could be authorized, such as providing a gate, rip-rap on eroded areas, and
the building of culvert at the state's expense (TR 69, 70).
As a matter of fact these conditions and items were brought
to the attention of Plaintiff as a part of the agreement with
them, and as Mr. Hisatake admitted (TR-71), they are binding upon the state. And as Plaintiff has not performed on
this part of their agreement and promise, we submit that
the trial court should make these items and conditions a part
of the finding and judgment in the case, which was not done.
Therefore, just as the gate, rip-rap, and culvert items
were outside of the contemplated contract with Defendants,
and yet authorized, so also should the providing of water to
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L)r:fendants be approved and authorized, which was in fact
nwrlc a part of the contract by reason of the documents all

being attached to the writing of February 2, 1960, and for
o\'er six years never denied or objected to as being an obligation of the state.
It is further the contention of Defendants that the
j 11 mishiny of water to them by Plaintiff wa1 in fact ap-

proved and authorized by reason of the writing and actions
of lhe state and its agents over these several years, and even
though the Federal Government may not participate in the
cost for some technical reason, Plaintiff nevertheless, by all
that is equitable and proper, should be bound, just as any
private person or corporation would be under the circumstances.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that Plaintiff should
be bound by its promises and agreements to furnish Defendants with water or be required to pay just compensation for
not doing so.

POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO DENY

ITS AGREEMENT AND OBLIGATION TO FURNISH
DEFENDANTS

WITH

WATER OR

A

WATERING

SOURCE FOR LIVESTOCK.
We have set out, what is believed to be undisputed facts
and evidence of the Plaintiff's promises, agreements, actions, and efforts to provide water for Defendants over the

r
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past six and one-half years, in our ST A TEMENT OF
FACTS and in our POINT ONE, and so we refer the court
to those facts and evidence therein presented as a part of
our argument here.
There should be no question that the state has power to
contract and may be bound thereby. In 49 Am. Jur. 285, Sec.
tion 74 the law seems clear:
"The rights and responsibilities of a state under
an ordinary business contract are, with few excep.
tions, the same as those of individuals. Although it
cannot be sued without its consent, the state when
making a contract with an individual is liable for a
breach of its agreement in like manner as an individual contractor."
See also Campbell Bldg. Co. vs. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 p 2nd 857.
In the instant case, we submit, that had the state not
been involved as a contracting party, there would be no question of the obligation to construe the promises, writing, and
actions involved herein as a contractual responsibility. Can
the Plaintiff, then, after leading Defendants to believe it
was actually going to furnish the source of water promised,
and causing Defendants to spend considerable money and a
great deal of time on these matters over the six year period
suddenly renig on its agreements and promises and hide
behind the state's immunity and claim lack of authority to so
contract? We think not, and Plaintiff should be estopped
from denying its obligation.
In I ALR 2nd 346, Section 6 it refers to the question of
estopple:

19
"Assuming, however, the presence of all the
prerequisites for the application of the doctrine of
estopple as between individuals, under some circumstances the public or the United States or the state
may be held estopped if an individual would have
been estopped, as when acting in a proprietary or
contractual capacity."
The fact that Plaintiff was dealing with Defendants on
the disposition of lands is evidence of this transaction being
in a proprietary or contractual capacity. (See on this point
-Stmnd vs. State, 16 Wash. 2nd 107, 132 p 2nd 1011).
Again in 28 Am. Jur. 2nd 784, Section 123, it states:
"Thus as a general rule, the doctrine of estopple
will not be applied against the state in its governmental, public, or sovereign capacity, unless its application is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest
injustice . .. "
"A state may be held estopped when acting in a
proprietary or contractual capacity."
From the notes on page 34 7 of I ALR 2nd the case of
State E.l-. 1'el. Upper Scioto Drainage and Conservancy Dist.
cs. Tmcy, 123 Ohio St. 399, 181 NE 811 was cited wherein
the court held :
"That the state, by participating in a proceeding through one of its departments acting within the
scope of its departmental powers concerning lands
toward which the state was exercising a proprietary
function, was estopped to claim that the law under
which the proceeding was brought was unconstitutional or violative of a compact between the United

.....
iI
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States and the state of. Ohio.
The court said tiW1.1,11
.1
.
s t a t .e can no more .ea t its pw and hal'e it than Cfl)l 111•
01·cl mary corporation or an individual."
· '

In State e.r rel, Caldwell v. Laucoln SI reet R. Co .. 311
Neb. 333, 114 NW 422, 118 NW 326, it was held:
"The state, like an individual, may be estopped
by its acts or ]aches, and should not be allowed to
oust a corporation of its rights and franchises, whm
for a long series of years it had stood silent and sec;
the corporation expend large sums in the acquisition
of property and improvements made thereon under a
claimed right so to do under its charter."
1

Also, in State e:r rel Washington Pacing Co.
90 Wash. 450, 156 p. 554, the court stated:

ii.

Clausen,

"Even where the government may not be barrea
by mere ]aches, it may be estopped in pais by such
actions with individuals as make it a question of
honest dealing."
We therefore submit that in order to prevent manife&t
injustice, honest and fair dealing over a long series of years,
wherein Defendants have had their land tied up and ren·
dered useless from lack of a water source for their livestock,
and fully expecting the water to be forthcoming through the
acts and promises of the state, said Plaintiff should be estopped from denying its agreements and obligations tu
Defendants.
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POINT THREE

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE A
FINDING AND JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FURNISHING A GATE, RIP-RAP AND A CULVERT ON
DEFENDANTS' LAND.
By reason of the highway project going through Defendants' land, Defendants suffered other problems, in addition to the taking of land and loss of access to their water.
The Plaintiff, through its agents and counsel promised, and
it was stipulated to in the trial court (TR-71), to provide
Defendants with a 16 foot access gate across a 20 foot lane,
with rip-rap to prevent erosion from spring run offs, and
with a culvert to prevent erosion in a ditch.
No finding or judgment was made as to these items by
the court, and we respectfully submit that the trail court
should be directed to make such a finding and judgment.

CONCLUSION
In view of the written promise of Alden S. Adams and
the many other assurances and promises, and efforts to actually carry out those promises, on the part of Plaintiff, its
agents and employees over a six year period of time to provide a watering source for Defendants, and the expending
of e:onsiderable time and money in reliance thereon, and the
further loss of use of some 3,000 acres of land for grazing
of livestock over six years, we respectfully submit to this
r:ourt that it would be a manifest injustice, unfair dealings,
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and most inequitable to allow the Plaintiff, State Road C
om.
mission, to renig on its agreement and obligation to perfor
m.

We therefore respectfully petition this court to reverse
the findings and judgment of the trial court, and make bind.
ing upon Plaintiff the obligation to provide water or a
watering source for Defendants for their liveRtock, or in
the alternative, either to pay adequate compensation for not
doing so, or to return Defendants' land to them from the
original taking with an annulment of the entire proceedings.
In addition Defendants submit that they are entitled to
additional findings and judgment in regard to Plaintiff's
furnishing a gate, rip-rap, and a culvert on Defendants'
land.
Respectfully submitted,
SP AFFORD & YOUNG
Suite 201, Dixon Building
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys .for Appellants

